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AbstrACt
There are many reasons why Slovenia needs to change its management of 
network industry infrastructure and question the legacy we wish to pass onto 
the next generation. However, these issues are not at the forefront of the 
public debate despite being as relevant today as the pension reform, if not 
even more. Until now, no government in Slovenia has adopted a systemic 
approach to infrastructure-related issues; instead, they have let partial 
interests prevail. This paper and the vision of infrastructure management 
present a synthesis of the current state of profession and past experiences 
in infrastructure management and financing acquired by the most developed 
countries, as well as practical experiences concerning the regulation, financing, 
and management of network industry infrastructure. The practical experience 
and empirical findings call for a consistent use of the RAB principles and for 
the restructuring of certain and partial privatization of all network industries. 
Foreign experience tells us that if the changes are correctly implemented, 
the current state of infrastructure can be significantly improved and could 
lead to a considerable decrease in real infrastructure costs and/or an increase 
in the availability of funds for infrastructure renovation or expansion. In 
the future, EU regulations might also expand and raise their requirements 
to meet the state of the art, but Slovenia need not wait for the EU. The 
introduction of such a policy would also mean a quantum leap in terms of the 
competitiveness of Slovenia's economy and bring the country closer to the 
world's most developed economies. 
Key words: network industries, economic regulation, ownership, privatization, efficiency, 
infrastructure financing, intergenerational equality, utilities
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1 Introduction
Debates concerning the investment needs and financing of new or existing 
infrastructure in transport, energy, and other infrastructure subsystems have 
been present in the world for some time. On the basis of own research and 
analyses of international institutions the McKinsey Global Institute (Dobbs 
et al., 2013) estimated that USD 57 trillion in infrastructure investment 
will be needed by the year 2030. The EU's investment needs for the same 
period were estimated at EUR 1.5 trillion just for the subsystem of transport 
infrastructure. Such estimates, although carried out with due care, can 
only be illustrative, as most countries do not possess the appropriate data 
framework that would enable a more informative assessment of investment 
needs into existing, as well as new infrastructure. They do, however, provide 
indications regarding the size of the gap. According to Slovenia's Resolution 
on National Development Projects for the Period 2007–2023, EUR 8.9 billion 
would need to be invested into the modernization of the railway network; the 
investment needed for the modernization of the national power grid, supply 
and other aspects of the energy sector would be around EUR 24.99 billion in 
the period 2010–2030, according to the data provided by the National Energy 
Programme (IJS, 2011); certain other estimates which are not included in the 
present paper were also given for other infrastructure subsystems. The scope 
and content of investment needs in these areas in Slovenia were and still are 
a subject of discussion. However, on the other hand it is clear that Slovenia 
currently has no solid, publicly adopted, and comprehensive strategy for the 
financing, and management of its infrastructure. 
This paper does not deal in detail with each of the previously stated issues at 
the level of Slovenia, but rather attempts to outline a transparent vision of 
the financing, and management of infrastructure, while taking into account 
the state of the art and best practice of the most developed countries.
In this paper ”(physical) infrastructure” refers mainly to network industries, 
which are subject to severe market imperfections and result from certain 
characteristics which normally allow these to be classified as natural 
monopolies.
Primarily, examples would include:
• distribution of electrical power (not its marketing/sales),
• distribution and supply/pumping of water; and sewage and treatment 
of waste water;
• distribution of gas (not sales);
• railway infrastructure (services/availability of railway infrastructure and 
not transport services);
• road infrastructure;
• segments of telecommunications networks;
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•	 port	infrastructure;
•	 reserved	postal	services;
•	 other	 systems	with	 similar	 features	 (e.g.	multiplex	 capacity	 for	 radio	
and	television,	production	of	electrical	power	in	Slovenia)	which	meet	
the	criteria	for	natural	monopolies,	but	are	exposed	to	competition	to	
a	limited	extent.	
It	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 an	 industry	 does	 not	 need	 to	 comply	with	 all	 the	
theoretical	presumptions	to	be	termed	“a	natural	monopoly”;	what	is	crucial,	
is	the	justification	of	the	argument	that	competition	is	 limited	to	an	extent	
that	makes	state	intervention	necessary	in	the	form	of	economic	regulation,	
which	tries	to	mimic	competition.	
The	 manner	 how	 countries	 managed	 their	 infrastructure	 in	 the	 past	 has	
been	changing,	mainly	due	to	a	better	understanding	of	the	 importance	of	
incentives	in	economic	regulation	of	infrastructure	managers,	and	as	a	result	
of	the	evolution	of	infrastructure	financing	and	procurement	mechanisms.	
By	changing	their	approach,	countries	were	looking	to	address	several	issues:	
•	 There	 is	 an	 absence	 of	 suitable	 performance	 incentives	 for	 (natural)	
monopolies	caused	by	an	absence	or	lack	of	competition.
•	 Governments	(and,	in	the	past,	also	regulators)	are	known	to	be	myopic	
and	 focused	 on	 cutting	 costs	 of	 infrastructure	 services	 to	 a	 level	
that	only	allows	the	recovery	of	current	operating	costs	without	any	
depreciation	costs	(full	cost	recovery	is	impossible).	If	the	infrastructure	
managers	are	state-owned	companies,	they	operate	as	long	they	can	
pay	salaries	to	their	workers,	while	the	state	of	infrastructure	continues	
to	 deteriorate.	 Optimization	 of	 infrastructure	 running	 costs	 is	 not	
possible.	This	creates	additional	costs	and	introduces	generation-based	
discrimination	because	deferred	costs	of	replacement	or	maintenance	
investment	are	now	transferred	to	the	next	generation	of	taxpayers	or	
users.	Such	a	set	up	makes	private	capital	investments	impossible.
•	 Managers	of	publicly-owned	infrastructure	find	it	difficult	to	withstand	
pressure	from	the	owners	to	cut	the	costs	of	infrastructure	investment	
without	 considering	 the	 effects	 of	 such	 savings	 on	 subsequent	
operating	 and	 maintenance	 costs	 of	 the	 infrastructure	 concerned	
(Parker	&	Hartley,	2003).		
•	 The	mechanisms	of	traditional	infrastructure	procurement	have	often	
proven	 inferior	 to	contemporary	procurement	methods,	 in	particular	
in	 capital-intensive	 infrastructure	 (road,	 rail,	 and	 other	 types	 of	
infrastructure),	and	in	terms	of	cost	overruns	and	schedule	delays.
•	 Adverse	political	interests	(e.g.	the	need	for	publicity,	clientelism)	often	
lead	to	supply	of	the	wrong	infrastructure,	a	type	of	overinvestment	
that	also	 leaves	 the	 future	burden	of	operation	and	maintenance	of	
this	infrastructure.	
28 International Public Administration Review, Vol. XII, No. 1, 2014 
Dejan Makovšek, Klavdij Logožar
The rest of this paper gives a brief presentation of the solutions, which have 
been widely used in addressing infrastructure system management and 
infrastructure procurement issues.
2 Economic Regulation in Network Industries
In economic theory the behavior of a monopoly is well understood. In the 
absence of competition, the operation of such a company prevents the 
maximization of social welfare and achievement of other economic policy 
objectives. A text book reading on the treatment of monopoly are the papers 
of Laffont and Tirole (1993), published in the 1980s and 1990s. Today, it is 
generally believed that such cases require incentive regulation, performed by 
a designated institution or an independent regulator. The regulator can be set 
up as either a transitional regime to facilitate the evolution of competition, or 
a permanent regime when the introduction of competition is not viable or 
feasible. Especially in the latter case, the regulator mimics the competition 
through incentives to achieve the following goals (Joskow, 2006):
• efficient pricing of products and services (prices near actual costs);
• efficient production (at the lowest possible costs);
• efficient supply of services and investments (to ensure the volume or 
quantity of products/services to satisfy the demand and to execute 
investments in a timely and effective manner);
• suitable level of quality and diversity of products/services;
• potential income redistribution;
• providing the monopoly with a rate of return that encourages it to 
perform, but no more than that.
With an aim to achieve these objectives, regulators use various instruments 
which include: control over the monopoly's prices; demands upon the 
monopoly to introduce a special regulatory accounting convention that will 
enable accurate determination of cost prices of the monopoly's services; 
benchmark analyses of the monopoly's efficiency against other comparable 
firms (also abroad), etc. 
In practice, regulators face a number of challenges in their efforts to meet 
these goals. One of the most important challenges is the asymmetry of 
information between the regulator and the firms it regulates. Even though the 
regulator has at its disposal a range of mechanisms to control and monitor the 
monopoly's business, it cannot be 100 % informed about its operations (e.g. is 
the monopolist as efficient as he could be, given the available technologies). 
The monopoly may use this deviation to its advantage, for example by 
persuading the regulator that higher service prices are crucial to its economic 
sustainability.
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Among the most extensively used and effective regulatory systems in large 
network industries in the developed countries is incentive based regulation. 
In this approach two concepts are crucial, the RAB (RAB – Regulatory Asset 
Base), and incentive mechanism, most commonly known as the RPI-X model. 
In such a system the infrastructure manager is issued a license, specifying 
its rights and obligations. It can also be called a “regulatory contract.” The 
two principles, the RAB and RPI-X, will be briefly presented in the rest of this 
paper, followed by the question of ownership in infrastructure management
2.1 RAB
The first principle is a baseline, which refers to all assets employed by the 
infrastructure manager in the supply of regulated services (e.g. in a power 
utility, the RAB includes all assets, used by the utility in the provision of 
its services). The regulator determines the RAB by trying to assess the 
appropriate asset value (not necessarily the book value of assets). It must also 
ensure that the RAB is maintained (depreciation) and expanded (new CAPEX) 
if new capacity demands so require. The capital expenditures increase the 
value of RAB. 
In addition to assessing the RAB value and necessary expenditures to maintain 
or expand the RAB, the regulator must also determine the manager's operating 
costs and, finally, the financing cost (the cost of equity and debt), which also 
include an appropriate return on the RAB. Through this process, the manager 
arrives at a predictable cash flow, against which it can borrow. The described 
process is known in the scientific community as the RAB financing model. 
A key feature of the RAB model is that it provides a guarantee to the manager 
(and to potential investors, if it were privatized) that it is not at risk of (hidden 
or gradual) expropriation. This guarantee normally comes from the legislation, 
which imposes upon the regulators a duty to ensure that the monopoly 
generates sufficient revenue to finance its functions. The generated revenue 
should enable the monopoly to secure a return on its initial investment into 
the existing RAB, allow investment into new infrastructure (investment 
expenses or capital expenditures that increase the RAB), depreciation 
(investments to preserve the value of the RAB), operating costs (OPEX, or 
operating expenditures), and an appropriate reward or return, provided it 
performs its function efficiently.
Figure 1 presents the position of the regulator. When the infrastructure 
manager can finance its functions entirely through the sale of its services 
(infrastructure access and related services), other sources of financing are 
not needed. Such utilities include road network inframanagers or power 
distribution system inframanagers. In other cases, however, RAB financing 
is not (yet) possible for a variety of reasons. For example, high investment 
needed for the build-up of the railway infrastructure prevents the 
infrastructure manager to fully finance its operations from the sale of services 
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(railway infrastructure usage fees payable by transport companies), although 
these are socially or economically justified. A direct state contribution is 
needed, but it should not depend on the current political will and budgetary 
planning, as this can cause numerous detrimental effects such as the inability 
to plan and optimize infrastructure maintenance and management (the time 
inconsistency problem).
Figure 1: RAB financing model
Source: Authors
When the utility cannot finance its operations solely from the sale of its 
services, the regulator, legally obliged under the RAB to finance the operations 
of the utility, shall set up a dedicated direct financing scheme. These funds 
are ring-fenced and therefore safe from discretionary interventions from 
the government. The government participates in the management of state-
owned utilities (appoints the supervisory and management boards) and 
formulates their strategic policies (e.g. a national transport policy for the 
transport sector).
The regulator strives for maximum independence from the government and 
its political influences (although complete independence is not practically 
achievable). It is financed through a license issued to the monopoly or through 
a regulatory contract between the regulator and the utility (and paid by the 
utility). Several recommendations concerning regulator independence have 
been made by international organizations such as OECD and others, but they 
are outside the scope of this paper.
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The RAB model per se is a collection of principles to preserve the financial 
and functional value of (physical) assets through time and prevent time-
related reallocation of burdens arising from the preservation of the value and 
functionality of these assets. Therefore, the RAB is an essential component of 
intergenerational equity in any area financed by taxpayers (e.g. healthcare – 
buildings and equipment of hospitals and other health centres). 
To conclude, the RAB financing model can in principle be combined with 
project financing structures to provide the regulator with greater control 
over the effective implementation of large infrastructure projects and ensure 
more favourable outturns.  
2.2 RPI-X
The RAB defines the basis to determine the baseline prices of utility services, 
but by itself it does not provide any incentives for the regulated company to 
become more efficient. The efficiency incentive comes from the adjustments 
of the baseline price. One of the currently most popular models in this 
context is the RPI-X or the price-cap model, which was developed in the 1980s 
(Littlechild, 1983). The abbreviation, RPI stands for the consumer price index 
(or retail price index in the UK), and X denotes the expected efficiency savings.
In line with this principle, the regulator allows the monopoly to adjust its prices 
in accordance with the growth rate of the selected price level (the rate of 
inflation or another suitable price index), but reduces this growth rate by the 
X-factor of inefficiency. The regulator determines the X-factor on the basis 
of benchmark analyses with identical or similar firms in the country, or with 
similar firms abroad. The approach is also known as “yardstick competition“, 
which was formalized by Schleifer and Vishny (1985). A simple illustration is 
provided in the following example. Let’s assume that the retail price index 
shows an annual price growth of 2 %, and that the benchmark analysis has 
shown that the monopoly is 20 % less efficient than the most efficient 
companies in the industry. Since firms are unable to adapt instantaneously, 
the regulator decides that the monopoly shall increase its efficiency by 10 % 
over the next five years (i.e. by 2 % a year). As a result, the monopoly may 
adjust its prices by 0 % per year (RPI is + 2 % per year, and the inefficiency 
factor is also 2 %), which means that the prices are lagging behind retail prices 
in real terms. 
The RAB and the RPI-X described briefly above are two concepts which 
showcase a big part of the function of economic regulation in a network 
industry. In the next chapter, we summarize what economic theory has to say 
about ownership in network industries.
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2.3 The Importance of Utility Ownership
For many decades economic theory assumed that in a market where 
competition is viable and active, privately owned firms are more efficient than 
those publicly owned. Empirical evidence to support the conclusion was only 
provided at the beginning of this millennium when Megginson and Netter 
(2001) published a paper confirming this theoretical expectation. 
In countries where institutions could be classified as insufficiently strong 
(Guasch, 2004, for example, gives an overview of South America's experiences) 
privatization of network industries did not always yield the expected results. 
On the other hand, extensive research conducted in other countries points out 
the positive effects of regulation and changes in utility ownership structure. 
Estache and Rossi (2010) explored a representative sample of 220 electric 
utilities from 51 development and transition countries in period 1985–2005 to 
show that establishment of a regulatory agency was essential in the increase 
of efficiency and that the privatized firms were more efficient than regulated, 
state-owned enterprises. An even more extensive study, conducted by the 
World Bank (Gassner et al., 2009) used a dataset of 1,200 utilities (water 
distribution, waste water collection and treatment, electricity distribution) in 
71 development and transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe. The 
sample included 301 utilities with private sector participation (PSP) and 926 
state-owned enterprises. Table 1 illustrates several findings of the study.
Table 1: Improvements made by PSP firms compared to state-owned 
enterprises over a period of no less than five years
Criterion Improvement 
Number of residential water connections + 12 %
Number of residential water connections per utility worker + 54 %
Number of residential electricity connections per utility worker + 29 %
Residential sanitation coverage (streets/waste) and sanitation services   + 19 %
Water sold per utility worker + 18 %
Electricity sold per utility worker + 32 %
Collection rate + 45 %
Electricity lost in distribution − 11 %
Source: Gassner et al., 2009.
Other interesting observations include an over 20 % reduction in the number 
of utility employees and an increase in operational efficiency. The study found 
no considerable difference in the scope of investment undertaken by state-
owned and privately-held enterprises. 
33Mednarodna revija za javno upravo, letnik XII, štev. 1, 2014
A Vision of the Policy Concerning the Financing and 
Management of Physical Infrastructure in Network Industries in Slovenia
Among the developed European countries, Great Britain has had the most 
experience with regulating and privatizing natural monopolies. The country 
privatized almost all large network industries, predominantly with the 
application of the RAB approach. In almost all regulated and privatized 
industries privatization led to increased efficiency and reduced customer 
prices (Parker, 2004), securing at the same time adequate returns for the 
private owner, full cost recovery, and equal or higher quality of services. 
There are, however, two controversial cases that may argue otherwise: the 
privatization of water supply enterprises and the privatization of the rail 
infrastructure manager. 
A decrease in employment following privatisation (and after introducing 
economic regulation) as observed in Gassner et al. in 2009 in developing and 
transitional countries was also recorded in Great Britain. 
Table 2: Decrease in employment in certain Great Britain network industries, 
as a result of privatization and the change in retail prices
Industry
Number of 
employees AT 
privatization/(year)
Number of 
employees AFTER 
privatization/(year)
Changes (real1) 
in end user prices 
(time of study)
Electric power 
distribution 
127,300 
(1990/1991) 66,000 (1996/1997)
from − 25 to − 34 %  
(1990−1999)2
Telecommunications 
(British Telecom)
238,000 
(1979/1980)
124,700  
(1999)
− 48 %  
(1984–1999)3
Gas distribution 92,000  (1986)
70,000  
(1994)
− 26 %  
(1986–1997)4
1 The figure is based on the general price level growth, which means that the nominal drop  was even  
 greater. 
2 Measured in England and Wales.  
3 In this case the decrease can also be attributed to technological progress and, indirectly, an increase in  
 competition as a result of privatization.  
4 In the original text, ”2.6 % per year”, which would amount to 26.6 % in 11 years; rounded  down.
Source: Parker, 2004.
Some other studies (i.e. Pendleton, 1997) have shown that the increasing 
efficiency of companies, which was reflected through lower labor costs, was 
mainly the result of a reduction in the number of (excess) employees and did 
not include wage cuts.
3 Proposals on the Organization of Infrastructure 
Management, Financing, and Regulation in Slovenia
In the area of economic regulation in Europe there are basically two 
approaches. A regulator (agency) may be one that has a number of sectors, 
each covering a distinct area, or the regulators are separated organizational 
units (separate agencies) for specific network operations. In Slovenia the 
organization of these functions is partly a consequence of the requirements 
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of the EU directives, and partly of the historical reasons and maneuvers of 
various interest groups.
Among the network activities listed in the introductory chapter, we have a 
regulator (as an agency), which carries out the functions of the economic 
regulation of network activity, as envisaged in economic theory and practice, 
established in the following major areas:
•	 postal services (regulator APEK, recently renamed to AKOS);
•	 telecommunications	–	fixed	and	mobile	network	(the	regulator	APEK);
•	 distribution of electricity and gas (regulator AGEN RS).
In light of the topics treated so far, we outline several propositions, based 
on	 which	 we	 can	 discuss	 how	 an	 efficient	 organization	 of	 infrastructure	
management and regulation in Slovenia could look like:
•	 Slovenia is a small country, so the planning and management of 
infrastructure	 is	also	a	boutique	 industry	and	the	number	of	experts	
who	can	dominate	this	area	is	correspondingly	limited.	The	small	size	
of	the	country	dictates	that	economic	regulation	has	to	be	organized	as	
efficiently	as	possible.	For	example,	the	rail	traffic	subsystem	controller	
–	 the	 Office	 of	 the	 Rail	 Regulator	 in	 the	 UK	 –	 employs	 around	 300	
people.  A controller in Slovenia would never be able to employ on such 
a scale, simply because of the cost burden to the regulated company. 
Nevertheless,	in	principle	the	complexity	of	the	Slovene	rail	system	and	
of the British one, at its core and the economic laws that govern it, 
cannot	be	very	different.
•	 For	some	network	industries,	due	to	their	nature,	because	of	the	losses	
in the economies of scale or other aspects it will never make sense to 
have more than one infrastructure manager (the railway infrastructure 
is	one	such	example).
•	 When the economies of scale allow more than one infrastructure 
manager, creating several managers makes sense (how many is a matter 
of	economic	analysis),	so	that	the	benefits	of	their	mutual	competition	
can be obtained.
•	 In cases where the infrastructure management is fragmented down 
to a level that is no longer economically optimal (due to diseconomies 
of scale), it becomes necessary to create incentives for mergers of 
companies. One of the most prominent regulators of water distribution 
and sanitation services in the EU, Portugal's ERSAR, is continuing the 
reorganization	of	services	related	to	water	(drinking	water	and	sewage)	
that	begun	in	1993.	The	reorganization	led	to	a	transformation	from	
total fragmentation at the level of numerous municipalities to mergers 
at the level of regions.
•	 When	different	 types	of	 infrastructure	are	mutually	 complementary,	
it is also possible to combine infrastructure management, although 
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funding remains separate. An example of such an organization is 
Traffikverket, the central infrastructure manager of the railway and 
road infrastructure in Sweden, which is also responsible for coordinated 
planning of road, rail, air, and maritime infrastructure.
• In other cases, it makes sense to create conditions for the development 
of competition and it is better to establish several infrastructure 
managers instead of one. The network industries, in which a transition 
from a single to multiple infrastructure managers is taking place, are 
not many and take time. An example would be the transition from one 
national provider of telecommunication services (which is at the same 
time also the infrastructure manager) to a competitive market of fixed 
and mobile communication services. Another similar example could be 
the liberalization of postal services. 
Figure 2 presents how the economic regulation of network industries 
could be organized in Slovenia to exploit the similarity among different 
areas through shared services. It is important to point out that within such 
an organization each sectoral regulator should have its own director, who 
has his/her own supervisory board (or council, if the form of an agency was 
chosen). The composition of such a body has to be different for each sector 
(since in principle each sector concerns the various stakeholders and interest 
groups). We do not address further details of such an organization here but 
we assume that it should follow best practice in terms of independence as 
well as corporate governance.
3.1 Infrastructure Management in Slovenia 
As noted before the ownership of the infrastructure manager is not a 
trivial question. But in any case it is necessary to economically regulate 
the infrastructure manager, if it does not operate in a competitive market. 
Transfering the management of a natural monopoly to a private partner, 
if the monopoly is not economically regulated, is unreasonable in terms of 
social welfare outcomes. In principle, it is also possible to choose other forms 
of organization of relations between the state and infrastructure manager, 
which do not require economic regulation as presented in this paper. These 
include for example, long-term concession contracts or management 
contracts. 
Thus empirical research clearly points to the benefits of economic regulation, 
which can be substantially increased through later privatisation, when the 
development of competition is possible. In those sectors, where it is likely 
impossible to introduce competition, the answer to the question whether to 
privatise or not, is less clear. To shed some light on this issue, we review below 
the studies on the effectiveness of economic regulation of state owned 
companies in Slovenia. 
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Figure 2: A vision of management and economic regulation of the network 
activities in Slovenia
Source: Authors
Hrovatin (2010) cites a number of results from comparative analyses on the 
effectiveness of Slovenian infrastructure managers, which are predominantly 
owned by the state (or municipalities):
• Slovenian distributors of drinking water on average reached only 84 % 
cost-effectiveness in the period 1997–2003, where the least efficient 
company operated with 67 % efficiency, and the most efficient with 
93 %.
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•	 Compared	 to	 foreign	 distributors	 of	 natural	 gas	 (the	 Netherlands,	
the	 United	 Kingdom)	 for	 the	 year	 2003,	 the	 efficiency	 of	 Slovenian	
distribution	 companies	was	 at	 48	%;	 and	 Hrovatin	 and	 Zoric	 (2012a)	
in	 a	 recent	 study	 concluded	 that	 there	were	no	major	 shifts	 in	 cost-
efficiency	in	the	period	2007–2011.
A	 similar	 comparison,	 based	 on	 data	 for	 2003,	 was	 also	 carried	 out	 for	
electricity	distributors:
•	 In	 comparison	 to	 the	 British	 and	 Dutch	 distribution	 companies,	 the	
Slovenian	companies	operator	with	58	%	cost	efficiency;	more	recent	
research	for	this	sector	(Hrovatin	&	Zorič,	2012b),	which	focused	on	the	
period	2004–2010,	was	able	to	measure	a	mere	1	%	improvement	in	the	
OPEX	efficiency,	which	led	to	the	conclusion	that	the	failure	to	produce	
a	significant	efficiency	improvement	was	the	result	of	“lax	regulation”.
•	 Consistent	with	economic	theory,	Hrovatin	(2010)	cites	other	research,	
which	 concludes,	 that	 the	 differences	 in	 efficiency	 between	 the	
Slovenian	and	foreign	companies	are	explained	by	the	small	size	of	firms	
(inadequate	economies	of	scale)	and	the	lack	of	proper	regulation.	
If	we	summarize	the	research	findings	in	Slovenia	and	abroad,	the	regulation	
of	 companies,	 when	 they	 are	 state-owned,	 is	 in	 principle	 less	 effective	 or	
ineffective.	Such	a	result	is	to	be	expected,	since	state	ownership	is	inextricably	
linked	to	political	appointments,	stronger	pressures	of	rent-seeking	interest	
groups,	and	the	manipulation	of	the	concept	of	“national	interest”.
These	findings	suggest,	that	even	in	those	network	industries,	where	it	will	
not	be	possible	to	introduce	some	form	of	competition,	privatisation	should	
still	 be	 considered.	 In	 practice,	 the	 main	 reason	 is	 the	 consistent	 inability	
of	 Slovenian	 politicians	 to	 establish	 the	 appropriate	 mechanisms	 for	 the	
accreditation	 of	 adequate	 corporate	 leadership,	 and	 their	 inability	 to	 stop	
interfering	in	the	daily	operations	of	state	owned	companies.	
To	summarise,	for	those	areas	where	regulation	is	in	place	and	it	is	possible	to	
introduce	competition	at	some	level,	the	professional	debate	about	whether	
to	 include	 private	 capital	 in	 the	 management	 infrastructure	 is	 redundant,	
since	all	expectations	from	theory	and	empirical	studies	point	to	the	fact	that	
this	 is	 necessary.	 In	 those	 cases	 where	 competition	 cannot	 be	 introduced	
at	 any	 level	 (e.g.	 management	 of	 railway	 or	 road	 infrastructure),	 the	 only	
impulses	that	mimic	the	incentives	of	competition	come	from	the	regulator.	
However,	 taking	 into	 account	 the	 overview	of	 experiences	 in	 Slovenia	 (i.e.	
the	 efficiency	 of	 economic	 regulators	 in	 Slovenia),	 the	 regulator	 is	 unable	
to	 carry	 out	 his	 functions	 in	 full	 if	 the	 regulated	 companies	 are	 owned	by	
the	 state,	 because	 the	 regulator	 can	 never	 be	 fully	 independent	 from	 the	
state.	Therefore,	privatization	seems	 justified	even	 in	those	cases,	where	 it	
is	economically	sensible	to	have	only	a	single	infrastructure	manager.	Given	
the	global	experience,	in	part	summarized	in	this	paper,	it	is	only	in	this	case	
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that we can expect the necessary antagonism to be generated between the 
regulator and the regulated firm so that the first one can start to perform its 
function properly.
The available data suggests that the privatization is the economically sensible 
ultimate goal. In this context, it is necessary to bear in mind that such a process 
also leads to a long-term and gradual reduction of excess employment in the 
infrastructure management companies, which may represent several 10,000 
employees. However, it is also important to note, that such a process cannot 
significantly affect the rate of unemployment in the country because:
• It is a long-term process which would, judging by the experience of 
other countries, last for several years;
• It largely concerns technical staff (and not administrative staff or public 
officials, for example), who are more mobile in the economy;
• Such a process reduces the cost burden of the economy in general, 
increases its competitiveness, and indirectly increases employment in 
the economy.
Ultimately, however, it is also necessary to realize that even with the 
introduction of regulatory incentives, all of the challenges associated with the 
meaning of ownership are not resolved (Helm, 2009). There are a number of 
economic, policy, and technical issues, where in some cases, solutions were 
already proposed, while for others it is at least clear that they require special 
attention. There is no reason why Slovenia should repeat the mistakes of 
other countries in regulation and/or privatization. 
4 Conclusion
The state of infrastructure, its development, and the amount of funds 
devoted to it is one of the key elements of competitiveness of an economy. A 
global awareness of the importance of these issues is growing, and reforms 
that will fundamentally change the approach infrastructure related issues are 
in preparation.
Slovenia does not have a comprehensive overview of the state of its 
infrastructure and it does not have an efficient and transparent system for 
the management of its infrastructure. A similar assessment would apply 
to infrastructure procurement and a comprehensive national plan for 
infrastructure. 
In this paper we have tried to outline a vision for the financing and 
management of physical Infrastructure in network industries in Slovenia. This 
vision establishes a financing model (RAB) and a central organization – the 
economic regulator – in charge of incentives for the effective management of 
the infrastructure in various network industries. While this is not necessarily 
an indispensable part of the proposal, empirical research suggests that 
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the effects of economic regulation can be further improved through 
privatisation of infrastructure managers. Only in this case can we expect 
that an appropriate antagonism will be created between the regulator and 
the regulated company, which will allow an uninhibited performance of the 
former. 
Through these changes, a process of economic restructuring would come 
about, which does not reduce the scope or content of the welfare state, 
but represents merely a transition to a long-term, more sustainability-based 
economy. Through the increase in the Slovenia’s competitiveness, it even 
allows the expansion of the boundaries of the welfare state.
We may consider the introduction of economic regulation and the RAB model 
in the extent presented in this paper to be a challenge. It is even a greater 
challenge to consider privatisation in network industries, knowing well 
that the perception of the role of private capital by the Slovenian public is 
very negative. The latter being the result of efforts by a number of interest 
groups, which benefit from the existing order of things. It is illusory to expect 
that the public institutions will be set free from their grip by themselves. 
Thus, the only means in overcoming this challenge is the mobilization and the 
rising awareness of civil society and the affected parts of the economy (e.g. 
a coordinated and persistant effort by the main chaimbers of commerce), 
which actually bear the burden and the consequences of inefficiency in the 
management and financing in network industries in Slovenia.
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POVZETEK
1.02 Pregledni znanstveni članek
Vizija politike financiranja in upravljanja fizične 
infrastrukture v omrežnih dejavnostih v Sloveniji
Ključne besede:  omrežne  dejavnosti,  ekonomska  regulacija,  lastništvo,  učinkovitost, 
privatizacija,  financiranje  infrastrukture,  medgeneracijska  enakost, 
javne storitve
V svetu že dlje časa potekajo razprave o potrebah in načinih financiranja 
investicij v novo ali obstoječo infrastrukturo na področju prometa, energetike 
in drugi infrastrukturnih podsistemov. McKinsey Global Institute (Dobbs et. al, 
2013) je na podlagi lastnih analiz in analiz mednarodnih inštitucij ocenil globalno 
potrebne investicije v infrastrukturo do leta 2030 na okrog 57 trilijonov USD. 
Samo v podsistemu prometne infrastrukture v EU so bile investicije v enakem 
obdobju ocenjene na 1,5 trilijonov EUR. Takšne ocene so, čeprav pripravljene 
z dolžno skrbnostjo, seveda lahko zgolj ilustrativne, saj mnoge države ne 
razpolagajo z ustreznimi podatkovnimi podlagami, ki bi omogočale čim bolj 
informativno oceno potreb investicij, ne samo v novo infrastrukturo, ampak 
tudi v obstoječo. Vendarle pa podajajo vsaj velikostna razmerja. V Sloveniji je 
Resolucija o nacionalnih razvojnih projektih 2007–2023 svoj čas ocenjevala 
potrebne investicije v železniško infrastrukturo v obravnavanem obdobju 
na 8,9 milijard EUR, potrebne investicije v energetsko infrastrukturo naj bi 
se po podatkih Nacionalnega energetskega programa (IJS, 2011) v obdobju 
2010–2030 gibale na ravni 24,99 milijonov EUR, nekaj ocen, ki jih v članku ne 
navajamo, pa je bilo podanih tudi za druge infrastrukturne podsisteme. Tudi 
ocene potrebnih investicij, ki so bile podane v Sloveniji, so bile predmet različnih 
polemik v zvezi z obsegom ali vsebino investicij. Načeloma pa je sprejeto 
dejstvo, da Slovenija danes ne razpolaga z jasno, splošno sprejeto, predvsem 
pa celovito strategijo, kako namerava svojo infrastrukturo financirati, naročati 
oziroma izgraditi ali izvajati in upravljati. Dodatni izzivi pa se pojavljajo tudi na 
drugih področjih, kot je na primer ocenjevanje upravičenosti investicij, kjer v 
Sloveniji prav tako ne sledimo najnovejšim dognanjem in dobri praksi v tujini. 
Pojem »(fizična) infrastruktura« se v tem prispevku pretežno nanaša na 
kontekst t. i. omrežne dejavnosti. Te so zaradi svojih značilnosti predmet več 
neučinkovitosti delovanja trga (angl. market  failures). Te neučinkovitosti so 
posledica značilnosti omrežnih dejavnosti, ki navadno izpolnjujejo pogoje za 
uvrstitev v klasifikacijo t. i. naravnih monopolov (npr. distribucija električne 
energije, distribucija in črpanje vode ter kanalizacija in obdelava odpadnih vod, 
distribucija plina, železniška infrastruktura, cestna infrastruktura, segmenti 
telekomunikacijskega omrežja, pristaniška infrastruktura, rezervirane poštne 
storitve).
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Način, na katerega so države v preteklosti v preteklosti obravnavale 
infrastrukturo, se spreminja, glavno vlogo pri tem pa igra vse boljše razumevanje 
delovanja spodbud v ekonomski regulaciji upravljavcev infrastrukture ter 
evolucije mehanizmov financiranja in naročanja infrastrukture, kot so npr. 
različne oblike projektnega financiranja. S spremembo svojega odnosa so 
države želele rešiti več problemov, med katerimi so predvsem naslednji:
• (Naravni) monopolist nima ustreznih spodbud za učinkovitost zaradi 
neobstoja ali premajhne konkurence. 
• Vlade (in v preteklosti tudi regulatorji) so nagnjene h kratkovidnosti in 
težijo k zniževanju stroškov storitev, ki izhajajo iz infrastrukture, na tako 
raven, da je omogočena samo povrnitev tekočih stroškov iz poslovanja, 
ne pa tudi stroškov amortizacije (onemogočeno je pokrivanje celotnih 
stroškov; v svetu pa se je v tem kontekstu uveljavil pojem full cost 
recovery). Ko so upravljavci infrastrukture podjetja v državni lasti, to v 
praksi pomeni, da ta delujejo, dokler lahko delavci v podjetju dobivajo 
plače, medtem ko se fizično stanje infrastrukture slabša. Takšen 
položaj onemogoča optimizacijo življenjskih stroškov infrastrukture 
in s tem povzroča dodatne stroške, uvaja tudi medgeneracijsko 
nepravičnost, saj se odloženi stroški nadomestitvenih ali obnovitvenih 
investicij prenašajo na naslednjo generacijo davkoplačevalcev oziroma 
uporabnikov, onemogoča pa tudi investiranje zasebnega kapitala. 
• Upravljavci infrastrukture v javni lasti se težko ubranijo pritiskom lastnika 
na zmanjševanje stroškov posameznih investicij v infrastrukturo, ne da 
bi upoštevali vpliv takšnih prihrankov na kasnejše stroške obratovanja 
in vzdrževanja te infrastrukture (Parker & Hartley, 2003). 
Med danes najbolj razširjene in dodelane sisteme regulacije v najrazvitejših 
državah spada oblika regulacije s spodbudami. Ta temelji na osnovi, iz katere 
določimo izhodiščno ceno za storitev monopolista (regulirana vrednost 
sredstev – RAB), in na mehanizmu, po katerem se ta cena spreminja skozi čas 
– cenovna kapica (RPI-X model). V takšnem sistemu regulacije je upravljavcu 
podeljena licenca (dovoljenje za opravljanje dejavnosti), na katero so vezane 
njegove pravice in obveznosti – imenujemo jo lahko tudi regulatorna pogodba.
Pri prvem principu najprej potrebujemo osnovo, na podlagi katere se bo 
izračunavala cena (monopolistove) storitve oziroma določal njegov donos 
(angl. allowable return).To osnovo predstavlja regulirana vrednost sredstev 
(v nadaljevanju RAB – angl. Regulatory Asset Base). To so sredstva, s katerimi 
monopolist izvaja dejavnost, ki je predmet regulacije (npr. pri distributerju 
električne energije so to vsa sredstva, ki jih potrebuje, da lahko ustrezno 
opravlja svojo funkcijo). Regulator določi RAB tako, da skuša oceniti ustrezno 
vrednost sredstev (ta ni nujno knjigovodska) ter investicije, ki so potrebne, 
da se ohranja (finančna in uporabna) vrednost teh sredstev (amortizacija). 
Upošteva pa tudi nove investicije v širitev zmogljivosti ali dvig kakovosti 
storitev/proizvodov, ki povečujejo RAB. Poleg ocene vrednosti RAB mora 
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regulator ugotoviti tudi, kakšni so stroški tekočega poslovanja monopolista, 
in končno, kakšen je strošek (lastniškega in dolžniškega) kapitala. 
Z RAB je določena osnova za določitev izhodiščne cene infrastrukturnih 
storitev. Samo uravnavanje cene skozi čas pa je prav tako instrument 
regulatorja. Eden danes najbolj uveljavljenih je model cenovne kapice RPI-X, 
pri čemer RPI predstavlja rast splošne (ali druge izbrane) ravni cen, X pa 
predstavlja popravek za neučinkovitost.
Poenostavljeno povedano, po tem principu regulator za monopolista določi, 
da le-ta lahko svoje cene povečuje za rast izbrane ravni cen (lahko inflacije ali 
drugega primernega indeksa cen), zmanjšano za faktor neučinkovitosti, ki jo 
želimo v določenem obdobju odpraviti. Neučinkovitost regulator določi prek 
primerjalnih analiz z drugimi enakimi ali podobnimi družbami v državi, ali s 
primerjavami s tujimi podobnimi družbami. Najučinkovitejše družbe so na meji 
učinkovitosti (meja učinkovitosti – angl. efficiency frontier).
Ekonomska regulacija dejavnosti, ki imajo značilnosti naravnega monopola, 
je v vsakem primeru nujna. Vprašanje lastništva prav tako ni nepomembno 
in v tistih dejavnostih, kjer je v neki obliki konkurenco mogoče vključevati 
(razgradnja monopola), privatizacija jasno daje boljše rezultate, morebiti 
tudi zato, ker se s spremembo lastništva prekine »protekcionistični odnos« 
med državo in lastnim monopolistom  in omogoči, da do konkurence sploh 
pride. V primerih, kjer konkurenca sploh ni mogoča, je odgovor na vprašanje 
privatizirati ali ne manj jasen. V vsakem primeru pa ostajajo odprta tudi 
vprašanja o tem, v kakšnem obsegu (npr. ali je 100 % privatizacija edina pot) 
ali načinu lahko poteka sodelovanje z zasebnim sektorjem, da bi še bili deležni 
koristi večje učinkovitosti, hkrati pa zato plačali čim nižjo ceno v pričakovanih 
donosih zasebnega sektorja.
Glede na vse do sedaj navedeno postavljamo teze, ki so okvir za določanje 
učinkovite organiziranosti upravljanja infrastrukture in regulacije v Sloveniji:
• Slovenija je majhna država, načrtovanje in upravljanje z infrastrukturo 
pa je tudi sicer butična industrija, zato je število strokovnjakov, ki lahko 
to področje obvladujejo, temu primerno omejeno. Majhnost države 
narekuje, da mora biti ekonomska regulacija zastavljena čim bolj 
učinkovito. 
• Zaradi narave nekaterih omrežnih dejavnosti, zaradi izgub v ekonomiji 
obsega ali drugih vidikov (tak primer je železniška infrastruktura) 
v nekaterih primerih ne bo nikoli smiselno imeti več upravljavcev 
infrastrukture kot enega. Na drugih področjih, ko ekonomija obsega 
dopušča več upravljavcev infrastrukture, je smiselno, da jih je več 
(koliko, je stvar ekonomske analize), zato da lahko žanjemo koristi 
njihove medsebojne konkurence.
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•	 V	primerih,	ko	je	upravljanje	infrastrukture	razdrobljeno	na	raven,	ki	
ni	več	ekonomsko	optimalna	(zaradi	disekonomij	obsega),	to	pomeni,	
da	je	treba	ustvariti	spodbude	za	združevanje	podjetij.	
•	 Ko	se	različni	tipi	infrastrukture	med	sabo	dopolnjujejo,	je	prav	tako	
mogoče	združevati	upravljanje,	čeprav	financiranje	ostaja	ločeno.	
•	 V	 drugih	 primerih	 je	 smiselno	 ustvariti	 pogoje	 za	 razvoj	 konkurence,	
oziroma	bi	namesto	enega	dobili	več	ponudnikov.	
V	tem	članku	smo	skušali	orisati	trende	ekonomske	teorije	in	prakse	v	zvezi	z	
financiranjem	in	upravljanjem	infrastrukture	v	kontekstu	omrežnih	dejavnosti,	
pri	 čemer	 smo	 upoštevali	 nekatera	 najnovejša	 dognanja	 oziroma	 praktične	
izkušnje	najrazvitejših	držav.
Izid	 tega	 orisa	 je	 vizija,	 v	 kateri	 je	 vzpostavljena	 centralna	 organizacija	
–	 ekonomski	 regulator,	 ki	 bi	 skrbel	 za	 ustrezne	 spodbude	 in	 učinkovito	
upravljanje	 infrastrukture	 različnih	 omrežnih	 dejavnosti,	 obenem	 pa	 prek	
modela	RAB	omogočil	transparentno	upravljanje	z	vrednostjo	infrastrukture.	
Čeprav	to	ni	nujen	sestavni	del	tega	predloga,	empirične	raziskave	kažejo,	da	
je	 učinke	 ekonomske	 regulacije	 v	 nekaterih	 primerih	 mogoče	 še	 izboljšati,	
če	 na	 takšni	 podlagi	 izvedemo	 še	 privatizacijo	 upravljavcev	 infrastrukture,	
oziroma	da	ekonomski	regulator	sploh	lahko	začne	v	polnem	obsegu	izvajati	
svojo	funkcijo.	
Če	 je	 uvedba	 ekonomske	 regulacije	 in	modela	RAB	 izziv,	 je	 privatizacija	 ob	
zavedanju,	da	 je	pojmovanje	 vloge	 zasebnega	kapitala	 v	 Sloveniji	 v	 javnosti	
močno	negativno,	v	večini	omrežnih	dejavnosti	v	Sloveniji	še	težje	uresničljiva.	
Slednje	 je	 posledica	 tudi	 tega,	 da	 obstaja	 vrsta	 interesnih	 skupin,	 ki	 jim	
obstoječa	 ureditev	 ustreza.	 Vendarle	 pa	 se	 je	 treba	 zavedati,	 da	 omrežne	
dejavnosti,	 kot	osnova,	na	kateri	 se	 izvaja	gospodarska	aktivnost,	pomenijo	
manjšino	 zaposlenih	 in	 gospodarstva	 v	 Sloveniji.	 Alternativna	 možnost	
morebitni	tuji	 intervenciji	 (npr.	»trojki«)	sta	mobilizacija	 in	osveščanje	civilne	
družbe	 ter	 prizadetih	 delov	 gospodarstva	 (del	 Gospodarske	 zbornice	
Slovenije,	obrtniška	zbornica,	druga	združenja,	ki	zastopajo	interese	podjetij	
v	 Sloveniji...),	 ki	 pravzaprav	 nosijo	 breme	 in	 posledice	 neučinkovitosti	 na	
področjih	 upravljanja,	 financiranja,	 naročanja	 in	 razvoja	 infrastrukture	
omrežnih	dejavnosti	v	Sloveniji.
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